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Abstract
We propose a sequential nonparametric test for detecting a change
in distribution, based on windowed Kolmogorov–Smirnov statistics. The
approach is simple, robust, highly computationally efficient, easy to calibrate,
and requires no parametric assumptions about the underlying null and
alternative distributions. We show that both the false-alarm rate and the
power of our procedure are amenable to rigorous analysis, and that the
method outperforms existing sequential testing procedures in practice. We
then apply the method to the problem of detecting radiological anomalies,
using data collected from measurements of the background gamma-radiation
spectrum on a large university campus. In this context, the proposed
method leads to substantial improvements in time-to-detection for the kind
of radiological anomalies of interest in law-enforcement and border-security
applications.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Finding radiation anomalies
Radiologically active materials are used widely in industry, medicine, and research.
Yet an unsecured, lost, or stolen radiological source can present a major threat
to public safety (Gaffigan, 2012; Varley et al., 2015). To deal with the potential
environmental and security hazards posed by such a scenario, the United States
government uses various detection procedures at ports of entry to the country
(Ryan et al., 2014). Moreover, security agencies that try to prevent terrorist
attacks are keenly interested in the problem of identifying and locating stolen or
smuggled radiation samples (Zelakiewicz et al., 2011; Gaffigan, 2012; Ryan et al.,
2014; Alamaniotis et al., 2015). Even at the local level, police departments have
shown increasing interest in the deployment of systems for detecting anomalous
radiological sources (Tansey et al., 2015).
Statistically speaking, the radiological anomaly-detection problem is one of
detecting a change in distribution. Sequential data is collected from a sensor
that measures the energies of arriving gamma rays. These observed energies yt,i
are random variables drawn from an energy spectrum, which is a probability
distribution over the set of possible gamma-ray energies. The question is whether
those measured energies are from the normal background spectrum, and therefore
harmless, or whether they are from an anomalous spectrum due to the presence
of a nearby radiological source. If the data suggest the presence of an anomaly,
an alarm is raised, and some further action is taken.
The key methodological questions are how to measure departures from the
normal background gamma spectrum, and how to choose a stopping rule, or
equivalently a threshold for declaring an alarm. Clearly the observer must use
a stopping rule that balances the rate of false alarms against the possibility of
drastic harm caused by missing a true anomaly. A key practical challenge is that
neither the background spectrum nor the spectra of likely anomalies have any
particular parametric form.
In this paper, we study the question of how to construct a stopping rule for
detecting a change in distribution based on streaming data, without parametric
assumptions. Our proposed stopping rule is based on a sequential version of the
classical Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test, which we apply to radiological survey
data collected over several weeks from the campus of the University of Texas at
Austin. The paper emphasizes three key properties of the proposed approach.
1. Our test is both extremely simple in practice and, as we show, amenable to
rigorous analysis of both its false-alarm rate and its power.
2. The stopping rule for our method depends only on an easily understood, user-
defined tolerance for false alarms, and not on any underlying properties of
the data-generating process. (See Corollary 2.) In that sense, our procedure
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is analogous to a traditional (non-sequential) test based on a pivotal quantity.
This is not true of other all other existing methods, some of which involve
test statistics whose behavior depends on the null.
3. Most importantly, the method leads to large practical improvements over
existing methods for radiological anomaly detection. For hard-to-detect
anomalies whose spectra are poorly separated from the background—see the
cobalt example in Table 3—our test improves time to detection by nearly
an order of magnitude over existing methods.
1.2 Our data
Our primary data source consists of measurements of the background gamma-ray
spectrum that were collected during July and August 2012 at the University of
Texas J.J. Pickle Research Campus (hereafter, PRC). The measurements were
taken with a cesium-iodide scintillator detector hooked up to a GPS unit and driven
around campus in a golf cart. This enabled us to characterize the background
radiation over a wide spatial area. Our secondary data source consists of a small
field experiment, described in Section 5.
Our detector records the observed gamma ray energies in each two-second
window, and discretizes these energies into an extremely fine histogram comprising
4,096 discrete bins, where higher-numbed bins correspond to higher energies.
We winsorize the data at bin 2,048: most counts in the highest 2,048 bins are
overwhelmingly due to astronomical sources of high-energy gamma radiation,
meaning that fine-scale structure in this part of the spectrum is not very helpful
for detecting a terrestrial anomaly. Despite this very fine discretization, there is
effectively no practical difference from a truly continuous setting. See Section 3.4
for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
Figure 1 gives the reader some idea of the challenge posed by the anomaly-
detection problem, in the context of our data, by showing an example of a normal
regime and one in which there is an anomaly present. The first panel in Figure
1 shows the background energy spectrum at a specific location at the PRC, as
a black line. This has been estimated using the multiscale technique of Tansey
et al. (2015). The second panel shows a situation where there is an anomalous
radiation source mixing with the normal regime. Specifically, this is the theoretical
spectrum an observer would measure with our detector in the presence of a 100
milliCurie Cesium-137 anomaly located at a distance of 150 meters; this anomaly
accounts for the bump near bin 550. However, the bump is much less apparent in
the noisy data of the bottom two panels. At this distance, the anomalous source is
difficult to distinguish from the background on the basis of even 500 observations.
This noise is characteristic of the data collected in the field under operational
conditions and realistic time constraints.
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Figure 1: The top left panel shows an example density corresponding to a normal
background radiation at the PRC, while the top right panel shows the same
background but with the presence of an anomaly: a 100 milliCurie source of
Cesium 137 isotope located at distance of 150m from the detector. The bottom
two panels show histograms of 500 observations from the densities in the top two
panels. These represent an example of the raw data collected sequentially with
the detector, and illustrate the difficulty of the radiological anomaly detection
problem.
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1.3 Outline
Our goal is to construct a protocol that can detect a change in distribution as
quickly as possible while controlling the number of false alarms. To that end,
we construct a sequential anomaly detection procedure based on the classical
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for equality of continuous distributions. We establish
the statistical properties of our stopping rule, such as a lower bound for the power
of the rule when detecting unknown anomalous radiation levels. The proposed
approach is highly flexible, in that it can directly work with the raw observations
{yt,i}, where available, or with the binned counts from the spectrometer. We then
show that the method outperforms existing approaches both on simulated and
real data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts by putting our
sequential anomaly detection problem into a statistical framework and discussing
its relation with previous work in the literature. In Section 3.1 we revisit the
classical KS test and its discrete variants. Section 3.2 then briefly summarizes
the previously known sequential KS procedure. This is leads to the exposition
of our method in Section 3.3, presenting two views of the test that allow to
handle raw photon measurements and binned counts. We then move to study
the statistical properties of our approach in Section 3.4. Section 4 benchmarks
our proposed method on a variety of simulated examples. Section 5 contains our
main application to radiological anomaly detection, using the data described in
the introduction. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our contributions and discusses
some limitations of the approach.
2 Background on radiological anomaly detection
2.1 The assumed model
Although photons arrive in continuous time, a typical radiation detector outputs
measurements in discrete time. While our approach can handle continuous-time
measurements with no additional complication, hereafter we assume that time is
discrete, and that possibly multiple photons arrive at each time point.
We let {yt,i}Nti=1 denote the set of measured energies from the gamma rays
arriving at time t. The underlying physics imply that
yt,i
iid∼ ft , i = 1, . . . , Nt , Nt ∼ Poisson(µ) , (1)
for some overall count rate µ > 0, where ft is the gamma-ray spectrum at time t,
i.e. a probability distribution with sample space Ω ⊂ R+.
One simple approach to detect anomalies is to measure overall radiation
levels, i.e. to compare the overall count Nt with the background rate µ. But a
major problem with this approach is that different devices have different intrinsic
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sensitivities to radiation, and a search for an anomaly might involve a different
device than was used to measure the background. Moreover, in our background
data, we have observed noticeable differences in overall counts observed using
the same detector from one day to the next. This may be caused by changes
in the detector orientation or different heights of the detector above the ground
(depending on who was carrying it).
These facts imply that µ is not merely a property of the background, but a
property of the background and the measurement device/process considered jointly.
Thus from an operational standpoint, attempting to detect anomalies using Nt
is fraught with difficulties. It is much more robust and effective to monitor the
energies yt,i of the detected photons, which (after laboratory calibration) are
independent of the device and more sensitive to anomalous sources.
Therefore we frame the radiological anomaly-detection problem in terms of a
change in distribution: at some unknown time v during the search process, there
is a change in the probability distribution of measured photon energies. Explicitly,
there exist two pdf’s f0 and fc with sample space Ω such that
ft =
{
f0 for t ≤ v
fc for t > v.
We refer to f0 as the pre-change density, which is known; fc as the post-change
density, which is unknown; and v as the changepoint, also unknown. The classic
approach to detecting a change in distribution, due to Pollak (1987), is based on a
likelihood-ratio statistic, and requires the assumption that fc is in an exponential
family. But in our case, neither f0 nor fc take any particular parametric form,
necessitating a different approach.
In our application, the changepoint v is the moment when the observer starts
to measure photons from an anomalous source—for example, as a result of driving
and suddenly passing by an area containing an illicit radiation source. When this
happens, the radiation emanating from the unknown anomalous source mixes
with the background radiation. This implies that the post-change density satisfies
fc = w f0 + (1− w) fA, (2)
where w ∈ (0, 1), and fA represents a pdf associated with photon measurements
from a “pure” anomalous source.
Both w and fA are unknown. The weight w is a function of many variables,
including the distance from the detector to the anomalous source and the size or
intensity of the source. The density fA depends on the emission spectrum of the
source, together with the physics that govern the scattering of photons as they
interact with the surrounding environment on their way from source to observer.
Although the emission spectra of likely anomalies are known precisely, this does
not help in practice: fA does not refer to the emission spectrum of the anomaly,
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but rather what an observer would actually see from that anomaly in the absence
of background. In a controlled laboratory environment, the contribution of an
anomalous radiation source to the measured spectrum has a simple and known
dependency based on distance from the observer and attenuation in air. However,
in a complex urban environment, the range of densities of different building
materials, together the complex geometry of structures in the built environment,
combine to produce an extremely complex, unknown transfer function between the
source emission and the detected emission at any given location. Thus while (2)
helps us to understand the problem, it does not explicitly help to detect anomalies,
and is not a formal assumption of our method.
2.2 Connections with previous work
In recent years, radiological anomaly detection has attracted significant attention
from the research community. Broadly speaking, there are two typical anomaly-
detection scenarios: (1) a stationary detector, such as those at ports or border
crossings; and (2) mobile detectors, of the kind used by law enforcement to screen
for illicit radiological sources (like dirty bombs). The method we propose is
appropriate for either scenario, although the real-data examples we consider in
this paper all involve mobile detectors.
Characterizing the background spectrum. In the mobile detector scenario,
law-enforcement personnel visit different sites within a search area and take
radiation measurements. These (noisy) measured spectra can then be compared
against the background spectrum f0, which varies spatially due to differences
in naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) in the natural and built
environments. In much of the radiation literature, the background is determined
from recent observations as the detector moves. These measurements are often
smoothed using a moving average or Kalman filter (e.g. Pfund et al., 2006).
However, much of the recent work in this area focuses on using previous
background observations to improve detection sensitivity (Vetter et al., 2015).
In this type of system, the detection phase is preceded by a long-term mapping
phase—for example, the kind of radiological survey described in Reinhart et al.
(2014). This means that each measurement can be compared with the background
at the current location, rather than some global average background or the average
spectrum of the last ten minutes. For many other references on this idea, see
Tansey et al. (2015). Throughout the paper, we assume that the spatial variation
background has been fully characterized using historical radiological survey data
(which is, in fact, available for our real-data examples), and we therefore use the
background at the current location for f0.
Detecting anomalies. We highlight two different kinds of approaches to radi-
ological anomaly detection: retrospective and sequential.
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Retrospective methods analyze a batch of data collected in the past. Both Chan
et al. (2014) and Reinhart et al. (2015) independently established a connection
between retrospective radiation detection and the classical Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test, which was also used by Tansey et al. (2015). Several other retrospective
approaches have been built upon the Spectral Comparison Ratio (SCR) statistic,
introduced by Pfund et al. (2006). This includes work by Du et al. (2010) and
Reinhart et al. (2014). These methods compare a transformed test-count vector
with a known background vector, and assume that the null distribution of this
test vector is approximately normal. This implies a chi-square distribution on
a dissimilarity measure between observations and background. There have also
been efforts to apply this framework to the sequential anomaly detection problem.
For example, Pfund et al. (2010) proposed an extension of the SCR algorithm to
the sequential framework. However, it is not entirely clear how to select some
of the method’s tuning parameters. Moreover, our experiments show that the
method is underpowered compared to the proposal considered here, particularly if
the anomaly is poorly separated from the background, or if the anomalous source
is located far from the detector.
Finally, there are other possible anomaly detection methods available that
exploit the discreteness of the measurement process. Recall that our photon
measurements {yt,i}Nti=1 are binned into a very fine histogram at each time t. This
produces a vector of counts xt = (xt,1, . . . , xt,D), where D is typically large (in
our case, 2048). If we assume without loss of generality that the sample space
Ω = [0, 1], we can partition Ω into discrete energy channels {Bj}Dj=1 as
Bj = [(j−1)/D, j/D), for j = 1, . . . , D−1, and BD = [(D−1)/D, 1]. (3)
The count in energy channel j is
xt,j = |{i : yt,i ∈ Bj, 1 ≤ i ≤ Nt}| , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , D}.
Given the sampling model in (1), one immediate avenue to study the change-
point detection problem is to assume that
xt,j ∼ Poisson(λ(0)j ) , (4)
i.e. the events in channel j happen at baseline rate λ
(0)
j . Here λ
(0) is known
beforehand. After the unknown change point, i.e. when t > v, the counts are
generated independently as
xt,j ∼ Poisson(λ(c)j ) , (5)
where the vector λ(c) is unknown. From (4) and (5), it would seem that, in
principle, any sequential changepoint-detection procedure that applies to a Poisson
distribution, and that can handle an unknown post-change rate, could be used to
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construct a radiological anomaly-detection procedure.
The classic paper on detecting a change in distribution for exponential families
is by Pollak (1987), who proposes to compute, at every time, a retrospective
log-likelihood ratio. (We refer to this method as EF; see also Mei, 2006, for a gen-
eralization). Unfortunately, the theoretical guarantees in this paper are limited to
the one-dimensional case, and to non-lattice distributions. Both explicitly exclude
the model in (4), which involves a multivariate vector of Poisson observations. A
version of the test in Pollak (1987) can still be applied, but its formal properties
have not, to our knowledge, been characterized yet. Methods based on generalized
likelihood ratios (GLR) have been studied by several authors (Siegmund and
Venkatraman, 1995; Basseville et al., 1993; Lai, 1995).
We will use these sequential methods based on the Poisson assumption (4–5)
as benchmarks to study the power of the proposed approach. However, we point
out that they all suffer from the same practical difficulty as a test based on a
comparison of Nt with µ, the overall radiation level. Specifically, they require
that the detector used to search for anomalies has the same overall sensitivity to
radiation as the device used to measure the background, so that the per-channel
Poisson rates are comparable. In most practical search scenarios, this cannot be
guaranteed. This is an important practical reason to prefer the KS-based approach
proposed here.
3 Stopping rules from sequential KS tests
We now construct stopping rules for the anomaly-detection problem described
in the introduction. Our method builds upon the classical Kolmogorov–Smirnov
(KS) test (e.g. Massey Jr, 1951). This is a popular non-parametric method used
to assess whether a specific sample has been drawn from a given continuous
distribution. We note that, in the context of radiological anomaly detection, Chan
et al. (2014) and Reinhart et al. (2015) have successfully applied retrospective KS
tests for the radiological anomaly-detection problem. Our goal in this paper is
to construct a sequential version of this test, and to place the choice of stopping
rule for this test on a firm statistical foundation. In that sense, we provide a
nonparametric counterpart to the parametric sequential method of Pollak (1987).
3.1 The classical KS statistic and a discrete variant
To provide some context for our proposed approach, we first describe an instanta-
neous or single-window approach to anomaly detection based on the KS statistic.
Given the sampling model in (1), we denote by F0 the cumulative distribution
function (CDF) associated with f0. We also write Fˆt for the empirical CDF
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derived from the observations {yt,i}Nti=1 from time window t:
Fˆt(y) =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
1(−∞,yt,i](y),
for all y ∈ R, where 1A is the set indicator function of A. It is well known that,
for large Nt, the one-sample KS statistic
Dt =
√
Nt sup
y
∣∣∣F0(y)− Fˆt(y)∣∣∣ , (6)
converges in distribution to the Kolmogorov distribution.
For the binned-counts model from (4) and (5), an analogous statistic can be
constructed. We begin with the normalized vector of rates
w(0) =
(
λ
(0)
1
λ
(0)
·
, . . . ,
λ
(0)
D
λ
(0)
·
)
w(1) =
(
λ
(c)
1
λ
(c)
·
, . . . ,
λ
(c)
D
λ
(c)
·
)
with
λ(0)· =
D∑
j=1
λ
(0)
j , λ
(c)
· =
D∑
j=1
λ
(c)
j .
From our Poisson model, Equations (4) and (5), we have
(xt | Nt) ∼ Multinom(Nt, w(1)) , w(1) 6= w(0) ,
where Nt =
∑D
j=1 xt,j, and where the new probability vector w
(1) is unknown.
We now let
F 0(j) =
j∑
k=1
w
(0)
k ,
denote the cumulative sum of the probabilities in the first j channels. This is like
a discrete approximation to F0. Similarly, define
Fˆ t(j) =
1
Nt
j∑
k=1
xt,k,
as the cumulative frequency of the counts at time t across the first j energy
channels. Next, define a discrete version of the KS statistic as
∆t =
√
Nt · max
1≤j≤D
|F 0(j)− Fˆ t(j)|, (7)
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as the (rescaled) maximum of the absolute differences between the background
CDF and the empirical CDF at time t. Under the normal regime, ∆t will very
nearly have a Kolmogorov distribution, whereas it will have a different (though
unknown) distribution if there is a change point.
We say “very nearly” here because, unlike the statistic Dt defined in (6),
the discretization to bins in (7) might introduce some small departure from the
theoretical Kolmogorov distribution, which assumes no ties among the data. But
this bias is virtually undetectable with a large number of bins (e.g. > 1000 in
our case), and in all of our data sets, the theoretical KS null distribution and the
actual null distribution of ∆t are identical for all practical purposes.
The statistic ∆t was used in Chan et al. (2014) and Reinhart et al. (2015).
Neither of these approaches, however, yields a satisfactory protocol for sequential
real-time analysis of radiological data—only retrospective detection using fixed
batches of data. One truly sequential approach using the KS statistic would be
to calculate a p-value from ∆t, and to use any of several recent procedures for
controlling the false discovery rate in a sequential-testing framework (e.g. Foster
and Stine, 2008; Javanmard and Montanari, 2015). But one obvious drawback of
this approach is that the ∆t statistic does not pool information across temporally
adjacent tests, and therefore has needlessly low detection power.
3.2 A predecessor sequential test
Our work is closest in spirit to that of Hawkins (1988), who proposed a sequential
“pooled” KS-based test in the setting of sequentially arriving, one-dimensional
observations. In our context of multiple observations per time point, this approach
involves computing at every time t the test statistic
κt =
t∑
k=1
Nk sup
y
∣∣∣F0(y)− Fˆ1:t(y)∣∣∣ ,
where Fˆ1:t is the empirical CDF between periods time 1 and t:
Fˆ1:t(y) =
1∑t
k=1Nk
t∑
k=1
Nk∑
i=1
1(−∞,yk,i](y).
Thus we see that data are pooled at each time step since the beginning (t = 1). A
crucial point is that κt is not the classical KS test statistic, and does not have a
Kolmogorov distribution under the null. This point was made in Hawkins (1988),
who compensated for this fact by choosing a large threshold for rejection. The
resulting stopping rule for raising an alarm is given by
inf{t : κt > c}, (8)
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Figure 2: Delay time for detecting a change point when the pre- and post-
change densities are given as in Figure 1. Here, E(Nt) = 500 and we evaluate
the performance of our KS method setting the threshold to a value that would
produce an average of one false alarm in an interval of size 1000, estimated on a
grid of values using 50 MC simulations. The y-axis shows the delay time in such
conditions and the x- axis varies the window size for our Ks method. A window
size equals one corresponds to the procedure from Reinhart et al. (2015).
where c > 0. Hawkins (1988) studied the asymptotic behavior of as the threshold
goes to infinity. In practice, one must select c to control the number of false
alarms over a given time period using historical data (or simulated data).
Unfortunately, we have found that the rule (8) suffers from having limited
power. To understand why, first assume that the change point happens long after
the beginning of the data collection (v  1). Then immediately after the change
point, the computation of κt will be dominated by samples from the normal regime.
As a result, (8) yields long delays when the pre- and post- change densities are
very similar, as it is the case considered in this paper (c.f. Figure 1).
To address this concern, the next section presents a different test that will
prove to be much more effective.
3.3 The proposed test
The idea of our proposed approach is simple: pool data across an increasingly
large series of backward-looking windows, and consider the maximal KS statistic
12
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Figure 3: Comparisons of the two KS methods proposed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3
when they have been calibrated to have one false alarm in an interval of length
1000. The first and second panels show the statistics Wt and κt as a function
of time respectively. In each panel the vertical line represents a change point
occurring at time 500. The horizontal line is the false alarm threshold. For the
predecessor pooled KS the threshold has been chosen, using 50 MC simulations,
to a value that leads to an expected value of one false alarm in an interval of
length 1000. For our KS method the threshold is chosen according to Corollary 2
in the next section such that the expected number of false alarms in an interval of
length 1000 is less than or equal to 1. The data before and after the change point
is drawn from the pre– and post–change densities illustrated in Figure 1. Also,
at every time t the number of photon measurements is Poisson distributed with
mean 500.
over those windows. To that end, for 1 ≤ s ≤ t and 1 ≤ j ≤ D, we define
wˆs:t,j =
∑t
k=s xk,j∑t
k=sNk
.
Next, we construct an empirical CDF based on samples from time s to time t as
Fˆ s:t(j) =
j∑
k=1
wˆs:t,k,
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for j = 1, . . . , D. We then use this to construct a variant of ∆t that accounts for
all the data collected between time s and t:
∆s:t =
√√√√ t∑
k=s
Nk max
1≤j≤D
|F 0(j)− Fˆ s:t(j)|.
Using this statistic, we define the window statistic W as
Wt = max
s:max{t−L,1}≤s≤t
∆s,t ,
and we propose to stop the data collection process at time
τL = min {t : Wt ≥ cL} , (9)
where L ∈ N and cL > 0 are constants.
The motivation behind (9) is that for any given time t, we look back and
see if there is evidence for a changepoint between times max {t− L, 1} and t.
We incorporate the window size L only in order to have a bound on the overall
complexity for computing the statistic at time t. With this bound, the method has
O(LD) cost at each time step. The idea of choosing a window size to look back
and use past data in sequential change-point detection has certainly appeared
before in the literature. However, existing work on this idea has been done in the
context of generalized likelihood-ratio tests, and requires parametric assumptions
(Lai, 1995). This constrains the computational cost of the GLR test, which would
go to infinity with its original definition. While similar in spirit to our proposed
approach, this does not involve aggregating counts, nor is it a fully nonparametric
test, both of which are practical requirements of our application.
As a special case, L = 1 corresponds to a single-window version of the test
from Reinhart et al. (2015). However, it is much better to choose L > 1. This is
empirically illustrated in Figure 2, where we can see a tremendous improvement
in detection time realized by using large values of L. A more formal statement of
this fact will be given shortly.
Finally, we illustrate with an example that our proposed KS sequential test
outperforms the variant of the test from Hawkins (1988) discussed earlier. This
is shown in Figure 3, where we see the tremendous gain in power given by our
procedure. The two tests are calibrated to have the same false-alarm rate. For
the pooled KS test from Hawkins (1988), the threshold has been chosen by Monte
Carlo simulation to yield an expected value of one false alarm in an interval of
length 1000. For our KS method the threshold is chosen according to Corollary 2,
presented in the next section, such that the expected number of false alarms in
an interval of length 1000 is less than or equal to 1.
In the later sections we will provide more comprehensive comparisons. We
now present some important properties of our method.
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3.4 Properties of the proposed test
We now turn to the question of how to choose the window size L and the detection
threshold cL. These choices are best illuminated through a careful study of the
probabilistic properties of ∆s:t. To this end, we introduce some notation. Let Fc
be the CDF induced by the post-change density fc, and let
d(Fc, F0) := max
1≤j≤D
|F0(ξj)− Fc(ξj)| ,
denote the discrete analog of the total-variation distance between the pre-and
post-change distributions, where ξj is the right end point of bin Bj. As before, v
is the changepoint.
We are now ready to state our first result, which provides an exponential
concentration bound on the behavior of ∆s:t. The result makes no assumptions
on the pre- and post-change densities, and it only involves the distance d(Fc, F0).
The proof relies heavily on Corollary 1 from Massart (1990).
Theorem 1. Assume that s > v is fixed. Then
lim
t→∞
∆s:t =∞ a.s.
provided that d(F0, Fc) > 0. Moreover, for cL > 0 the following inequality holds:
P
∆s:t > −cL + d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=s
Nk
 ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2 c2L) . (10)
As pointed out earlier, for t ≤ v the statistic ∆t is expected to behave like a
Kolmogorov-distributed random variable under the null hypothesis. This is also
the case for ∆s:t when s ≤ t ≤ v. The first part of Theorem 1 says that, as long
as we collect enough data from the abnormal regime, it is possible to (eventually)
detect this departure from the null at an arbitrarily high threshold. The inequality
(10) sharpens this claim by showing us how quickly the probability of detection
approaches 1, as a function of three quantities: the threshold cL, the magnitude
of the anomaly (as measured by total-variation distance), and the total number
of observations collected over the window from s to t.
The following corollary provides a bound of the number of false alarms arising
from our test and re-expresses the above inequality in a more immediately useful
form. To that end we define, for T < v,
AT =
∣∣∣∣{t : t ≤ T, maxmax{1,t−L}≤s≤t∆s,t ≥ cL
}∣∣∣∣ .
Here AT can be thought as the number of times that the process would be stopped
within a window of length T when there is no change point in {1, . . . , T}.
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Corollary 2. If T ≤ v, then
E(AT ) ≤ 2T L exp
(−2 c2L) .
In addition, if v < t < v + L, then
P (τL < t | τL > v) ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2 c2L)− P
√√√√ t∑
s=v+1
Ns <
2 cL
d(Fc, F0)
 .
where τL is given as in Equation (9).
Corollary 2 puts an upper bound on the expected number of false alarms up
to time T , provided that the change point happens after T . This corollary is
immediately practical: it can be used to set up the threshold cL and the window
size L. For a desirable T and a given tolerance, one can choose the cL and L so
that the expect number of false alarms is less than the tolerance.
We illustrate this with an example calculation of the threshold cL. Assuming
that L = 50 and T = 1000, as in Figure 3, we can set cL so that the expected
number of false alarms to be less than or equal to 1 over [1, 1000]. To see this, we
invoke Corollary 2:
E(AT ) ≤ 2T L exp
(−2 c2L) ≤ 1, for T = 1000, L = 50 .
This holds as long as
cL ≥
√
log(2T L)
2
≈ 2.4.
Hence for the example disused in earlier in Figure 3 we set cL to be 2.4.
Of course, different combinations of cL and L can lead to the same tolerance.
To have a more informed choice, we can look at the second part of Corollary 2.
This says that for a given window δt, the amount of time after the change point v
that one is willing to wait to detect the change point, we could constrain L ≥ δt.
Then for any  > 0, if √∑v+δt
s=v+1 Ns
2 cL
>
1

holds with high probability within the window δt, then we would be likely to
detect any changes that satisfy d(F0, Fc) > .
Finally, we observe that it is possible to define a version of ∆s,t that directly
works with the raw observations {yt,i}. This is done by defining the empirical
CDF
Fˆs:t(y) =
1∑t
k=sNk
t∑
k=s
Nk∑
i=1
1(−∞,yk,i](y).
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Then we can set
Ds:t =
√√√√ t∑
k=s
Nk sup
y∈R
|F0(j)− Fˆs:t(j)|. (11)
Hence replacing ∆s:t by Ds:t in (9), we obtain a stopping rule that can use the
raw observations rather than the discretization. From there it is possible to have
results as in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, replacing ∆s:t by Ds:t, and d(F0, Fc) by
the total variation distance between F0 and Fc.
4 Experiments on simulated data
We now undertake a comprehensive benchmarking study of our proposed approach,
using simulated data. These simulations have two goals. First, we will show that
our method yields competitive performance even in the fully parametric situation
where the pre- and post-change densities are known to be exponential families. In
that situation, the likelihood-ratio test of Pollak (1987) is expected to be optimal,
but we will show that the reduction in power from using our nonparametric test
is modest. Second, we will show that our method outperforms previous methods
in the nonparametric case.
4.1 Exponential family example
We will first show that, even in an idealized situation where the the parametric
form of the pre- and post-change distributions is known, our method can still yield
competitive results. We consider the scenario from Pollak (1987), where f0 is the
pdf of a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 6. For
the post-change density we restrict our attention to shifts in mean. Specifically,
we assume that fc is the pdf of N(µc, 6
2) where µc is an unknown constant. At
every time, we observe multiple observations Nt. We use our KS procedure as
given in Equation (11). Thus we work with the raw data {yt,i}.
Since the normal distribution has the sample mean as a sufficient statistic
for µc, we collapse the observations at every time t, {yt,i}Nti=1, into their average
y¯t = N
−1
t
∑Nt
i=1 yt,i. This simplification allows to use the exponential family method
from Pollak (1987) (EF), and the generalized likelihood-ratio method from Lai
(2001) (GLR). We recall that these methods were designed under the assumption
that at each time instance only one observation arrives. Hence, by working with
the averages {y¯t}, we can use these methods having as pre-change density the
pdf of N(0, 1/Nt). Here, for simplicity we assume that Nt is fixed and consider
different choices for this value. In the radiological anomaly-detection problem, the
per-period count rate Nt is a proxy for the overall sensitivity of the detector.
We recall that the EF method requires that we specify a prior for µc under the
post-change density, for the computation of the statistic at each time t (which is a
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Figure 4: Comparisons of the behavior of our KS, predecessor pooled KS, EF,
and GLR tests under different null hypotheses. In each case the null is N(0, σ),
and the three columns correspond to different values of σ: 2, 4, and 6, from
left to right. Each panel shows a histogram, derived from 100 Monte Carlo
simulations, of the maximum of the test statistic over an interval of length 1000.
Here, EF is computed with τ = 1 and under the assumption that after the change
point the true mean is unknown and the standard deviation remains unchanged.
Panels 10-12 then show the respective comparisons for the method GLR under
the assumption that both the mean and standard deviation change after there
is a change point. The KS-based test statistics do not depend on the null (top
two rows). The figure shows that the behavior of the EF and GLR test statistics
depends on the null (bottom two rows). This makes it more difficult to choose a
threshold for rejection.
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Table 1: Average time to detection for different methods under the scenario when
both the pre- and post-change densities have a known parametric (in this case
Gaussian) form. EF and GLR refer to the exponential family and generalized-
likelihood ratio tests described in the main text. The rejection thresholds are
chosen by Monte Carlo simulation to have an expected value of one false alarm in
an interval of length 1000 (except for KS∗ which is our KS test calibrated as in
Section 3.4). We consider different cases of the post-change mean µc. As expected,
the KS-based method does not have as much power to detect false alarms in this
situation as methods that exploit the known parametric form of the densities.
µc E(Nt) KS KS
∗ GLR EF
τ = .1
EF
τ = 1
EF
τ = 5
EF
τ = 10
0.1 100 96.1 98.2 94.0 92.5 95.0 95.0 95.0
0.1 500 85.0 96.7 72.1 72.9 72.3 72.8 72.8
0.1 1000 84.4 81.3 43.2 38.7 39.6 39.6 39.5
0.2 100 94.5 95.7 82.2 80.8 80.0 79.4 80.3
0.2 500 61.6 65.0 21.9 23.6 21.0 21.1 23.7
0.2 1000 32.8 34.1 12.1 12.9 12.1 12.2 13.3
0.3 100 86.3 86.8 51.3 61.0 43.2 49.9 49.9
0.3 500 33.3 33.7 10.2 13.3 9.8 10.3 10.3
0.3 1000 20.4 23.3 5.4 7.4 5.4 5.2 5.5
Bayes factor). We assume conjugate normal priors of the form N(0, τ 2), so that the
test statistic can be computed in closed form. We consider several different choices
for the standard deviation under the alternative hypothesis: τ ∈ {.1, 1, 5, 10}.
We calibrate methods EF and GLR by considering a retrospective window
size L, similar to the approach taken in our KS procedure and borrowed from Lai
(1995). The resulting stopping rules for EF and GLR are given in the appendix.
For our KS method we consider two choices of threshold. The first one
corresponds to calibrate such threshold using Monte Carlo simulations so the
expected number of false alarms in an interval of length 1000 equals 1. We denote
this procedure by KS. We also consider a variant, denoted KS∗ which is the one
given as Section 3.4 using Corollary 2. Clearly, KS∗ by construction provides a
more conservative rule than KS as the threshold for the former comes from an
upper bound on the number of false alarms in an interval of a given length and
for selected window.
We run comparisons varying the mean shift µc. This is shown in Table 1,
where we can see that our KS method is competitive, but not as efficient as the
EF and GLR methods, which are designed specifically for this case. It is clear
that, if both the pre- and post-change densities belong to a known parametric
family, our KS procedure should not be expected to be the best method. This is
consistent with the theory of Pollak (1987). As we will show next, however, this
is not the case for more general families of distributions.
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Figure 5: Pre and post change underlying densities for the mixture-of-normals
example in Section 4.2.
We do, however, emphasize one practical drawback of the GLR and EF
methods, which our method alleviates. This is shown in Figure 4, where we can
see that the distribution of the test statistic under these two methods depends on
the null hypothesis (i.e. it is not a pivotal quantity). This presents a challenge
when choosing the threshold for such methods: one must run simulations under
the assumed null to choose a threshold for a false alarm. In contrast, the choice
of the threshold for our method does not depend on the null, and can be easily
tuned using the theory provided in Section 3.4.
4.2 Mixture of normals
We now consider an example where the pre- and post- change densities are not
members of a simple parametric family. We show that in such a situation, our
windowed KS test offers a better choice. These findings will be confirmed in the
next section with data from field experiments.
To construct the example, we consider a mixture of four normal distributions
in the interval [−8, 8]. Since the methods EF and GLR are not designed to handle
general mixtures of normals, we implement these methods using binned counts of
the observations and then making use of the likelihood implied by (4) and (5).
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Table 2: Average time to detection for different methods under the mixture-of-
normals example. For each scenario, the number of Monte Carlo simulations is
100, and L= 50. For each method the threshold is chosen by Monte Carlo to have
an expected value of one false alarm in an interval of length 1000 (except for KS∗
which is our KS test calibrated as in Section 3.4). We consider different cases of
post change mean µc. PKS is the pooled KS test from Hawkins (1988).
D E(Nt) KS KS
∗ PKS EF GLR
29 100 192.6 318.8 290.3 274.8 287.8
29 500 42.4 67.7 117.3 71.8 62.1
29 1000 17.7 29.8 121.4 34.5 33.2
210 100 152.6 195.3 197.0 317.1 257.2
210 500 31.2 32.2 94.7 45.2 41.0
210 1000 12.3 15.4 64.0 31.3 30.4
211 100 60.1 94.0 130.2 289.1 192.1
211 500 12.5 16.1 81.8 35.9 36.18
211 1000 4.9 8.8 51.4 27.7 25.4
The resulting stopping rule for EF is defined as
inf
t :
t∑
s=max{t−L,1}
∫
Λ
t∏
k=s
p(xk|λ(c))
p(xk|λ(0)) dF (λ
(c)) ≥ c
 , (12)
where dF is a the product of independent identically distributed gamma priors
with shape and scale parameters set to 1. On the other hand, the stopping rule
for the GLR that we consider here is
inf
{
t : max
max{t−L,1}≤k≤t
sup
λ(c)∈Λ
t∑
s=k
log
p(xs|λ(c))
p(xs|λ(0)) ≥ c
}
, (13)
where λ(0) is given as in Equation (4).
With this setting, we observe from Table 2 that the sequential KS method
proposed in this paper offers better performance than the other alternatives. In
some cases the increase in power is substantial. The message of these results is
simple: when the nature of pre- and post- change densities is unknown, then the
sequential KS method should be preferred. Even using the more conservative rule
from Section 3.4 leads to generally better results than the competing approaches.
With a real-data example in the next section will further substantiate this claim.
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5 Application to detecting radiological anoma-
lies
5.1 Synthetic anomalies derived from real experiments
It is very challenging to design an operational test of a radiological anomaly-
detection system. Natural experiments are hard to come by, because true radi-
ological anomalies are mercifully rare. Moreover, for obvious reasons, extensive
field tests that involve placing many different radiological anomalies in a crowded
urban environment can present an unacceptable risk to public health and safety.
In the next section, we will present the results of one small field experiment
conducted in safe, highly controlled circumstances. But first, we demonstrate the
performance of our method at detecting realistic synthetic anomalies. This study
is made as realistic as possible using data collected from two sources:
1. The 18 hours of background data collected by driving a detector in a golf
cart around the University of Texas PRC, as described in the introduction.
2. A small field experiment designed to obtain spectra for two radiological
anomalies of the kind that might be encountered in a real law-enforcement
setting: cesium-137 and cobalt-60, both of which are in widespread use for
industrial and medical applications. To conduct the experiment, we used
small (844 nanoCuries) cesium and cobalt sources provided by the University
of Texas’s Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory. We partially shielded
the detector from natural background radiation using lead bricks, and we
placed the source 5 centimeters away from the detector. We recorded several
minutes of gamma rays from each source, producing detailed spectra.
Thus we have one data source that gives us a background, and another data
source that characterizes two likely anomalies. These give us f0 and two candidates
for fA in Equation 2, respectively. We use these to construct the synthetic post-
change densities in our experiments as follows:
fc =
(
λ0
λ0 + λsource
)
f0 +
(
λsource
λ0 + λsource
)
fA , (14)
where λ0 and λsource are the contributions from the background and the anomaly,
respectively. This is the same setup used in Tansey et al. (2015) when applying
the retrospective (i.e. not sequential) KS test.
The weights on f0 and fA are calculated as follows. Gamma radiation falls off
at the rate 1/d2 in space, where d is distance to the source, with an additional
exponential decay term due to air absorption. More specifically, as a function of
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Table 3: Average time to detection for different methods under the two isotopes
considered, Cesium and Cobalt. For each scenario, the number of Monte Carlo
simulations is 100, and L= 50. For each method the threshold is chosen, using
50 MC simulations, to have an expected value of one false alarm in an interval
of length 1000 (except for KS∗ which is our KS test calibrated as in Section 3.4).
We consider three different values for the distance in meters of the observer to the
source.
(a) Average time to detection for the cesium examples under the densities in Figure 6.
Dist. E(Nt) KS KS
∗ SCR PKS EF GLR
50m 100 1.3 1.6 200 19.0 7.1 5.9
50m 500 1.0 1.0 1.0 9.2 1.9 1.7
50m 1000 1.0 1.0 1.0 5.9 1.2 1.0
100m 100 9.8 12.0 200 66.8 24.1 19.7
100m 500 2.6 3.1 8.7 30.6 9.0 8.7
100m 1000 1.6 1.8 1.1 19.6 6.9 6.4
150m 100 111.2 161.3 146.5 208.0 143.4 117.9
150m 500 19.6 25.4 188.7 88.8 28.8 27.4
150m 1000 9.4 13.4 167.3 69.7 18.9 18.8
(b) Average time to detection for the cobalt examples under the densities in Figure 7.
Dist. E(Nt) KS KS
∗ SCR PKS EF GLR
50m 100 2.3 2.7 200 26.7 13.5 17.7
50m 500 1.0 1.0 21.4 12.9 7.6 8.9
50m 1000 1.0 1.0 1.0 8.1 5.1 5.2
100m 100 5.0 5.5 200 44.1 21.6 28.4
100m 500 1.4 1.6 170.1 20.9 12.1 14.4
100m 1000 1.0 1.1 7.8 13.0 10.0 9.9
150m 100 21.1 23.9 200 98.6 57.0 111.5
150m 500 4.9 5.9 194.9 46.3 25.7 31.0
150m 1000 2.9 3.3 168.5 28.7 22.0 21.6
d, the contribution of the anomaly to the observed spectrum is
λsource =
mCi
0.000844
· 630 ·
(
0.05
d
)2
· exp {−0.0100029(d+ 0.05)} , (15)
where d is distance to the source in meters and mCi is the size of the source
in milliCuries. Our experiment involving the cesium-137 source was used to
calibrate the parameters in Equation (15), based on the measured count rate at 5
centimeters.
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Figure 6: The first panel above shows the density corresponding to the normal
background radiation levels at PRC (pre–change density). Panels 2-4 then show
the spectral distortion of 100 milliCurie Cs-137 source placed at different distances
from the radiation detector.
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Figure 7: The first panel above shows the density corresponding to the normal
background radiation levels at PRC (pre–change density). Panels 2-4 then show
the spectral distortion of 650 milliCurie cobalt source placed at different distances
from the radiation detector.
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Experimental set-up and results. The post-change densities fc in our ex-
periments are obtained using Equations (14) and (15), by varying the source size
and the distance to simulate a range of λsource values. The resulting post-change
densities are shown in Figures 6 (cesium) and 7 (cobalt). We benchmark our
method against methods EF and GLR described previously, implemented using
the Poisson likelihood described in (4) and (5); see Equations (12) and (13) for the
actual stopping rules. We also benchmark against the pooled KS method (PKS)
from Section 3 (Hawkins, 1988) and the SCR method from Pfund et al. (2006),
For both the cesium and cobalt anomalies, we considered a range of settings of
distance-to-source d and overall detector sensitivity, as parametrized by E(Nt), the
expected per-period arrival rate of photons. We calibrated the rejection threshold
of each method so that they all had the same expected false alarm rate of 1 per
1000 time steps. This was done averaging over 100 Monte Carlo simulations,
choosing the threshold that produces the desired average false alarms rate. After
choosing the threshold, we simulated 100 data sets of length T = 700. In each
case, the true change point was randomly chosen between [100, 600]. All tests
with a window size used L = 50. To compare the power of each method, we
computed the average time to detection: that is, the average number of discrete
time steps after the change point until an alarm was raised, across all Monte Carlo
simulations. Lower times to detection indicate higher power.
From Table 3, we can see that the most effective detection method is our
KS procedure from Section 3.3, which outperforms all other methods across the
board. It offers sometimes dramatic improvements in detection time versus the
other methods. Its superiority is especially marked for the most difficult cases:
our method detects the very challenging case of a cobalt-60 source at 150 meters
(bottom left panel of Figure 7) an order of magnitude more rapidly than competing
methods. The SCR method has the most volatile performance. It performs about
as well as our KS test at detecting easy anomalies like the upper right panel of
Figure 6. But it performs much more poorly for anomalies that are difficult to
detect.
As a robustness check, we assess the sensitivity of different methods to the
choice of window size L. This is depicted in Figure 8, where it is clear that our KS
sequential procedure is the most efficient. Here we see that, although larger values
of L typically produce better results, the gain becomes smaller as L increases.
From our experience with these experiments, and other informal experiments not
described here, we have found that L ≈ 50 is a reasonable choice for the situations
considered in this paper.
5.2 A real anomaly
We conclude with an analysis of a small, controlled field experiment. A small,
harmless (6.293 micro-Curie) check source of radioactive cesium-137 was obtained
from University of Texas’s Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory and placed
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Figure 8: Average time to detection comparisons, over 100 MC simulations,
when the parameter L varies. Here the pre- and post- change densities are given
as in Figure 6 where post–change density corresponds to an anomaly located
at a distance of 100 m, and setting the intensity of photon measurements as
E(Nt) = 100. Moreover, for each method the threshold is chosen, using 100 MC
simulations, to have an expected value of one false alarm in an interval of length
1000. Note that PKS behaves like constant as it does not require to choose L. It
is plotted with the purpose of a more complete comparison.
at a known location on the University of Texas Pickle Research Campus, twelve
inches above the ground. (See Panels A and B of Figure 9.) A radiation detector
that outputs gamma-ray measurements in discrete 2-second intervals was then
placed in a golf cart and driven several times around an approximately rectangular
circuit of the nearby roads, passing within ten feet of the source at speeds under
10 mph. This protocol yielded approximately 33 minutes of data collected in
the presence of an anomaly (see Figure 9). The background spectrum f0 at this
location had been very well characterized from the month-long data-collection
effort described in the introduction, and could be treated as known.
We separated the 33 minutes of data into eight different independent test
windows of varying lengths: three large-length windows comprising a full circuit
of the testing site, and five shorter windows comprising a half circuit. Here a
“circuit” means one full lap of the golf cart around the testing site, as shown in
Panel A of Figure 9. We treat each window shown in Panel C of Figure 9 as a
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Figure 9: The setup for the real anomaly-detection experiment, in which a
radiation detector was driven around in a golf cart in an area where a known
(small, harmless) radiological anomaly had been placed. Panel A shows a map of
the test site, the GPS trace of the golf cart’s path (red lines), and the approximate
location of the anomaly (blue star). Panel B shows a photograph of the four
small laboratory check sources bundled together to form the anomaly. Panel C
shows the eight different test windows created from the 33 minutes of recording.
Windows 1, 2 and 6 each involve one full rectangular circuit of the roads around
the anomaly. Windows 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 each involve a half circuit. The y axis in
Panel C is Nt, the number of gamma rays detected in each discrete 2-second time
step.
separate test set.
To design our comparisons, we use historical data to estimate f0. We also use
different historical data as held out sets to calibrate the the false alarm threshold
for the methods EF, PKS, and GLR, and KS test. However, here we only use held
out sets that are not rejected when testing a one time KS test under the null f0.
This is done since the data historical data was collected over different locations,
and days of the year. Moreover, we consider KS∗ which is our KS test calibrated
as in Section 3.4. To reflect the relatively small size of the data set, we set the
expected rate of false alarms is set to be 1 in an interval of 175 time steps. We
refer to test windows shown in Figure 9 as 1–8 according to the order in which
they were collected.
Table 4 shows the results of the experiment. Overall, our KS procedure is the
best-performing method, confirming what we observed in our previous experiments.
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Table 4: Time to detection (measured by the number of discrete two-second time
steps required to raise an alarm for different methods in our real-data experiment.
We denote the detection time by ∞ for any method which was not able to detect
the anomaly in a given instance.
Test
window
KS KS∗ PKS EF GLR SCR
1 16 16 16 24 103 88
2 8 19 19 22 22 124
3 9 9 23 56 56 ∞
4 17 17 25 ∞ ∞ ∞
5 55 55 43 76 76 76
6 5 5 6 12 12 147
7 16 17 16 52 52 49
8 29 29 22 98 97 95
Our method detects the anomaly in all eight test windows, and is either the fastest
or second-fastest to do so in each case. The PKS method also detects the anomaly
in all eight windows, but for most cases not as quickly as our method does. The
EF and GLR methods detect the anomaly in seven out of eight cases, while the
SCR method fails to detect the anomaly in two cases.
6 Discussion
We have proposed a sequential nonparametric test for a change in distribution and
have characterized both its theoretical properties and its practical performance
versus plausible alternatives. The method can be deployed easily in any streaming-
data scenario, where retrospective batch tests do not match the design requirements
of the anomaly-detection system. Our theoretical results, as well as our experiments
on both real and simulated data, demonstrate that the method is both robust and
immediately useful for the problem of radiological anomaly detection.
While we have emphasized the mobile-detector scenario in this paper, our
method could also be applied in the fixed-detector scenario (e.g. at ports or border
crossings). A complication here is that stationary detector systems, while they
could benefit from our method as well, would involve extra methodological features
to ignore anomalies caused by known benign radioactive sources, like truckloads
of rock salt or granite (e.g. Runkle et al., 2009). Combining such a system with
our approach is an active area of research.
One final point worth noting is that real radiological data can have nuisance
components, and that the counts collected with an spectrometer could violate
the Poisson-distribution assumption. In this case, Theorem 1 and Corollary 2
would not hold as stated here, but would have to be adjusted to account for
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overdispersion (this was not the case with our real data). In situations where
the over-dispersion is constant, as assumed by Chan et al. (2014), our statistic
can easily be generalized, with no additional complication. Moreover, the over-
dispersion parameter can be estimated consistently, using background-only data,
as in Chan et al. (2014).
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A Proof of technical results
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First, we note that by the triangle inequality∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∆s,t√∑t
k=sNk
− d(Fc, F0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣ max1≤j≤D |F 0(j)− Fˆ s:t(j)| − max1≤j≤D |F 0(j)− Fc(ξj)|
∣∣∣∣
≤ max
1≤j≤D
∣∣∣|F 0(j)− Fˆ s:t(j)| − |F 0(j)− Fc(ξj)|∣∣∣
≤ max
1≤j≤D
|Fc(ξj)− Fˆ s:t(j)|
≤ sup
ξ∈R
∣∣∣Fc(ξ)− Fˆs:t(ξ)∣∣∣ .
(16)
Next we observe that since
∑D
j=1 λ
c
j > 0 and s > v then
P
( ∞∑
k=s
Nk = ∞
)
= P
( ∞∑
k=s
D∑
j=1
xk,j = ∞
)
= 1
hence by the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem we arrive to
P
 lim
t→∞
∆s,t√∑t
k=sNk
= d(Fc, F0)
 = 1,
and the claim follows since d(Fc, F0) > 0.
On the other hand, from (16), if
D′s,t :=
√√√√ t∑
k=s
Nk sup
ξ∈R
|Fc(ξ)− Fˆs:t(ξ)|,
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by Corollary 1 from Massart (1990) we obtain
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣∆s,t − d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=s
Nk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ cL
 ≥ P (D′s,t ≤ cL)
=
∞∑
ns=1
. . .
∞∑
nt=1
P
(
D′s,t ≤ cL, Ns = ns, . . . , Nt = nt
)
≥ (1− 2 exp(−2 c2L))
∑
ns,...,nt
P (Ns = s, . . . , Nt = nt)
= (1− 2 exp(−2 c2L)).
and the result follows.
Proof of Corollary 2
For the first part simply note that
E (AT ) = E
(
T∑
t=1
1{maxmax{t−L,1}≤s≤t ∆s,t≥cL}
)
≤
T∑
t=1
E
 t∑
s=max{t−L,1}
1{∆s,t≥cL}

=
T∑
t=1
t∑
s=max{t−L,1}
P (∆s,t ≥ cL)
=
T∑
t=1
t∑
s=max{t−L,1}
P (Ds,t ≥ cL)
≤ 2T L exp (−2 c2L)
where the last inequality follows from Corollary 1 in Massart (1990).
For the second part we observe that
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P (τL ≤ t | τL > v) ≥ P
(
max
max{t−L,1}≤s≤t
∆s,t ≥ cL | τL > v
)
≥ P (∆v+1,t ≥ cL | τL > v)
= P (∆v+1,t ≥ cL)
≥ P
∆v+1,t ≥ −cL + d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk, d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk ≥ 2 cL

≥ 1− P
∆v+1,t < −cL + d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk

− P
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk <
2 cL
d(F1, F0)

≥ 1− P
cL <
∣∣∣∣∣∣d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk −∆v+1,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣

− P
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk <
2 cL
d(F1, F0)

= P
∣∣∣∣∣∣d(Fc, F0)
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk −∆v+1,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ cL

− P
√√√√ t∑
k=v+1
Nk <
2 cL
d(F1, F0)

and the claim follows once more by Corollary 1 in Massart (1990) as in the previous
Theorem.
A.1 EF and GLR stopping rules for Section 4.1
The stopping rule for the EF method is given by
inf
t :
t∑
s=max{t−L,1}
∫
R
t∏
k=s
N(y¯k|µ(c), (6/
√
Nt)
2)
N(y¯k|0, (6/
√
Nt)2)
N(µ(c)|0, τ 2) dµ(c) ≥ c
 ,
(17)
where dF is a the product of independent identically distributed gamma priors
with shape and scale parameters set to 1. On the other hand, the stopping rule
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for the GLR that we consider there is
inf
{
t : max
max{t−L,1}≤k≤t
sup
µ(c)∈R
t∑
s=k
log
N(y¯s|µ(c), (6/
√
Nt)
2)
N(y¯s|0, (6/
√
Nt)2)
≥ c
}
. (18)
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